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Anthony C. Infanti 
Before there was a culture war in the United States over same-sex marriage, there was a 
debate between opponents and proponents of same-sex marriage within the LGBTQ+ 
community. Some within the community opposed pursuing the right to marry because of the 
long patriarchal history of marriage and the more consequential need to bridge the economic and 
privilege gap between the married and the unmarried. Others, however, saw marriage as a civil 
rights issue because of the central importance of marriage in American society. They sensed a 
profound wrong in denying marriage to same-sex couples who carried on lives no different from 
their heterosexual counterparts. Marriage proponents also lauded same-sex marriage’s 
transformative potential, contending that it would contribute to refashioning marriage into 
something new, better, and less patriarchal. Opponents, of course, feared the hegemony of 
heterosexual marriage and argued that same-sex marriage could not and would not transform 
American society. 
This essay looks back at this debate through the lens of the federal tax definition of 
marriage before and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Windsor1 and 
 Christopher C. Walthour, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
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Obergefell v. Hodges,2 which legalized same-sex marriage in the federal and state realms, 
respectively. Following the advent of marriage equality, the question is whether the promised 
transformative potential of same-sex marriage is being realized. In the realm of federal tax law—
the situs of perhaps the most intimate and sustained connection that citizens have with 
government—the answer thus far is a resounding no.  
After earlier opening the door to legally recognizing a broader array of relationships, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reversed course in the wake of Windsor and refused recognition 
to any relationship not denominated a marriage.3 At first, it seemed that the IRS was prodding 
states that had adopted civil union or domestic partnership regimes to recognize same-sex 
marriage—and this did, indeed, happen in the two years that separated the Windsor and 
Obergefell decisions. But after Obergefell, when every state was required to permit same-sex 
couples to marry, the IRS even more firmly closed the door to recognizing alternative 
relationship statuses, revealing its original move as reactionary and aimed at stymieing the 
transformative potential of same-sex marriage in this influential area of the law. This essay 
approaches the collision between faith in the ability to disrupt and overturn hierarchies and the 
reality of powerful and entrenched societal institutions such as heterosexual marriage as a case 
study of the complex relationship between legal and social change and of how, in keeping with 
2 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
3 These relationships go by many different names (e.g., civil unions, domestic partnerships, 
reciprocal beneficiaries, and designated beneficiaries) and entail differing sets of rights and 
obligations. For convenience, I refer to these relationship statuses collectively as either “marriage 
alternatives” or “civil unions and domestic partnerships.”  
 3 
Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, the dominant group in society manages agitation for 
change by subordinated groups while keeping its own privilege intact. 
I. THE DEBATE 
Before and after the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin,4 which first 
opened the door to extending the right to marry to same-sex couples in the United States, there 
was a lively debate within the LGBTQ+ community about whether marriage was a goal worth 
pursuing. In 1989, Thomas Stoddard and Paula Ettelbrick (both then of the Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund) engaged in a well-known exchange on this topic, with Stoddard 
making arguments in favor of marriage and Ettelbrick arguing against marriage.5 This exchange 
illustrates the arguments made on each side of the larger debate over whether to pursue marriage. 
A. Argument for Marriage 
Stoddard’s argument in favor of marriage was three-pronged. On a practical level, 
Stoddard accepted the privileging of marriage in American society as a given and asserted that 
same-sex couples should have access to the “substantial economic and practical advantages” of 
marriage, because reproducing those advantages outside of marriage is difficult and expensive—
                                                 
4 74 Haw. 530 (1993). Although Hawaii was on the path to be the first state to recognize same-
sex marriage after the landmark 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin, an amendment was later added 
to the Hawaii Constitution that placed the power to define marriage in the hands of the state 
legislature and effectively validated the challenged marriage law before a final decision could be 
reached in the case. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). 
5 See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 397406 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993). 
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and inherently incomplete.6 On a political level, Stoddard argued that marriage should be placed 
at the top of every LGBTQ+ rights organization’s agenda “[b]ecause marriage is … the political 
issue that most fully tests the dedication of people who are not gay to full equality for gay 
people, and also the issue most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men.”7 Finally, on a philosophical level, Stoddard favored the “right to 
marry” but did not advocate that, once achieved, all lesbians and gay men ought to exercise that 
right.8 Stoddard acknowledged that “marriage may be unattractive and even oppressive as it is 
currently structured and practiced.”9 But he argued that 
enlarging the concept to embrace same-sex couples would necessarily transform it 
into something new. … Extending the right to marry to gay people—that is, 
abolishing the traditional gender requirements of marriage—can be one of the 
means, perhaps the principal one, through which the institution divests itself of 
the sexist trappings of the past.10 
B. Argument Against Marriage 
In contrast, Ettelbrick took a highly critical view of marriage: “Steeped in a patriarchal 
system that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as its basis, the 
                                                 
6 Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, 
AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 398, 399400. 
7 Id. at 400. 
8 Id. at 401. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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institution of marriage long has been the focus of radical feminist revulsion. Marriage defines 
certain relationships as more valid than all others.”11 She saw marriage as antithetical to the 
“primary goals of the lesbian and gay movement.”12 On the one hand, Ettelbrick contended that 
“marriage will not liberate us as lesbians and gay men. In fact, it will constrain us, make us more 
invisible, force our assimilation into the mainstream, and undermine the goals of gay 
liberation.”13 On the other hand, she asserted that “attaining the right to marry will not transform 
our society from one that makes narrow, but dramatic, distinctions between those who are 
married and those who are not married to one that respects and encourages choice of 
relationships and family diversity.”14  
Ettelbrick also bristled at the constraints of legal discourse, which would require lesbians 
and gay men to accentuate how similar they are to heterosexuals in order to obtain marriage.15 
She saw this rhetorical erasure of difference as the Achilles’ heel of any attempt at transforming 
marriage: 
By looking to our sameness and de-emphasizing our differences, we don’t even 
place ourselves in a position of power that would allow us to transform marriage 
from an institution that emphasizes property and state regulation of relationships 
11 Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND
THE LAW, supra note 5, at 401, 402. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 403. 
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to an institution which recognizes one of many types of valid and respected 
relationships. Until the constitution is interpreted to respect and encourage 
differences, pursuing the legalization of same-sex marriage would be leading our 
movement into a trap; we would be demanding access to the very institution 
which, in its current form, would undermine our movement to recognize many 
different kinds of relationships.16 
Ettelbrick further feared that an unbending focus on “rights” would come at the expense of 
“justice” because obtaining the right to marry for a few “would do nothing to correct the power 
imbalances between those who are married … and those who are not.”17 
C. A Hindsight View 
Fast-forward a quarter century and it is easy to see how this debate was resolved. 
Opposition to pursuing marriage grew more muted within the LGBTQ+ community while 
opposition from without grew more vocal and governments of all levels took steps to prevent 
marriage from being extended to same-sex couples.18 Marriage eventually became the primary 
focus of the LGBTQ+ movement, and public opinion began to shift, with those in favor of same-
sex marriage outnumbering those against by the early 2010s.19 Following that shift in public 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 402. 
18 ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE WHO CARE 
ABOUT THEM) 154–57 (2007). 
19 ANDREW R. FLORES, WILLIAMS INST., NATIONAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON LGBT RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 19–21 (2014). 
 7 
opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two decisions just two years apart that extended 
marriage to same-sex couples on constitutional grounds. The first, United States v. Windsor,20 
required the federal government to legally recognize same-sex couples who were validly married 
under state law. The second, Obergefell v. Hodges, required all states to permit same-sex couples 
to marry.21 Though the legal battle for same-sex marriage was won, opponents continue to resist 
these judicial decisions.22 
In light of Stoddard’s and Ettelbrick’s (not to mention others’) sharply dissonant views 
regarding the transformative potential of same-sex marriage, these early years following the 
advent of marriage equality provide an opportunity to consider what, if any, transformative effect 
same-sex marriage has begun to have on American society. I explore this question by examining 
the IRS’s reaction to the Windsor and Obergefell cases. This tax lens is enlightening both 
because we all pay taxes or do things that trigger or impact our taxes every day and because tax 
benefits were at the heart of the legal arguments for marriage equality (indeed, Windsor itself 
involved a federal estate tax controversy).23 As this essay demonstrates, the IRS’s response to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage suggests that Ettelbrick’s concerns that the campaign for 
marriage equality would ultimately run counter to the LGBTQ+ movement’s goals of 
                                                 
20 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
21 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
22 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
23 Anthony C. Infanti, Victims of Our Own Success: The Perils of Obergefell and Windsor, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 79, 82–83 (2015). 
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encouraging the affirmation of difference and the validation of choice among family structures 
were well-founded. 
II.  PRE-WINDSOR TAX LANDSCAPE 
Historically, federal tax law deferred to state law when determining who is married.24 For 
more than eighty years, this meant that same-sex relationships were not recognized for federal 
tax purposes because no state permitted same-sex couples to marry. Following the Hawaii 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin,25 however, Congress feared that this deference to 
state law might soon force the federal government to legally recognize same-sex relationships.26 
In response, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage 
for purposes of federal law as a union of “one man and one woman.”27  
As states extended legal recognition to same-sex couples, DOMA denied them access to 
the tax certainty that accompanies marriage, instead relegating them to a wilderness of tax 
uncertainty. For instance, as I have explored in detail elsewhere, married different-sex couples 
who pooled their income were (and still are) protected from adverse tax consequences by federal 
income and gift tax exemptions for transfers of property between spouses.28 DOMA denied 
                                                 
24 Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981). 
25 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
26 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996). 
27 Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
28 See generally Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004). 
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same-sex couples access to these tax exemptions, but did nothing to instruct same-sex couples 
regarding how their intertwined financial lives would be treated for tax purposes in the absence 
of those exemptions. Same-sex couples had no idea which among many potential 
characterizations of the financial transfers between them the IRS might choose on an intrusive 
audit. Would the IRS attempt to characterize one partner’s greater contributions to the pool as 
payments for services, gifts, or support payments to the other—or something else entirely? The 
different potential characterizations entailed different tax consequences, some of which could 
result in punitively taxing the same dollars multiple times.  
While same-sex couples grappled with the uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of 
their relationships, the IRS provided helpful guidance to different-sex couples in states that 
permitted them to enter into marriage alternatives. With no statutory barrier to treating these 
different-sex couples as married for federal tax purposes, H&R Block sent an inquiry in 2011 to 
the IRS asking whether a different-sex couple who had entered into an Illinois civil union could 
file a joint federal income tax return.29 In keeping with basic tax principles that look to substance 
rather than form in determining tax consequences,30 the IRS responded that they could file a joint 
return because civil unions and marriages are legally equivalent under Illinois law.31 Word of 
                                                 
29 Amy S. Elliott, IRS Memo Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes, 133 TAX 
NOTES 794 (2011); Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, Branch 2, 
Internal Revenue Service, to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), 
available at 2011 TNT 215-62 (Tax Notes). 
30 See Estate of H.H. Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). 
31 Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, supra note 29. 
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this position circulated among the tax bar, and the Illinois Department of Revenue apparently 
relied upon it when advising different-sex civil union couples that they could file joint income 
tax returns at both the federal and state levels.32 Thus, before Windsor, there were cracks in 
marriage’s monopoly on relationship recognition for federal tax purposes that could only have 
been expected to grow once same-sex relationships were legally recognized at the federal level.  
                                                 
32 Same-Sex Civil Unions, ILL. REVENUE (2012), 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/individuals/same-sex-civil-unions.htm 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20120221025408/http://www.revenue.state.il.us/Individuals/Same-
Sex-Civil-Unions.htm] ; see Elliott, supra note 29. 
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III. POST-WINDSOR SURPRISE 
Shortly following the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 
2013-17 to clarify which same-sex relationships would be recognized for federal tax purposes 
because, at that time, the majority of states still denied same-sex couples the right to marry.33 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17 broadly recognized any same-sex marriage that was valid where 
celebrated, even if the couple resided in a state that refused to recognize same-sex marriages.34 
At the same time, the IRS explained that it would embrace a broad, purposive reading of the 
gendered terms husband and wife in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) so that those terms would 
include married same-sex couples.35 Then, at the end of that long ruling, the IRS summarily 
stated—without any supporting legal reasoning—that it would deny legal recognition to any 
relationship that was “not denominated as a marriage” under state law.36 
At first, some thought that the IRS’s position regarding marriage alternatives was simply 
political posturing. Because Windsor had no effect on state law (the decision merely required the 
federal government to revert to its historic deference to state law on questions of marital status), 
it was thought that denying legal recognition to civil unions and domestic partnerships might be 
a strategic move to pressure states that had created alternative relationship statuses to extend the 
right to marry to same-sex couples. Indeed, in less than a month, the IRS’s position was cited in 
a New Jersey court decision holding that the state’s civil union law unconstitutionally denied 
                                                 
33 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
34 Id. at 203–04. 
35 Id. at 202–03. 
36 Id. at 204. 
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equal treatment to same-sex couples.37 In that decision, the court ordered the State of New Jersey 
to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples.38 
Yet, any political impetus for denying legal recognition to marriage alternatives as a 
means of encouraging states to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples disappeared once 
the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, which mandated that all states extend the right 
to marry to same-sex couples.39 However, any hope that the IRS’s position was merely an act of 
political opportunism was quickly extinguished. Within a few months of Obergefell, the IRS 
proposed regulations that reaffirmed its position in Revenue Ruling 2013-17.40  
In those regulations, the IRS proposed to recognize “[a] marriage of two individuals … 
for federal tax purposes if the marriage would be recognized by any state, possession, or territory 
of the United States.”41 The regulations went on to provide that “[t]he terms spouse, husband, 
and wife do not include individuals who have entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil 
union, or other similar relationship not denominated as a marriage under the law of a state, 
possession, or territory of the United States.”42 The IRS provided three reasons for denying legal 
recognition to marriage alternatives: (1) states that created marriage alternatives “have 
                                                 
37 Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 361–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2013). 
38 Id. at 366. 
39 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
40 Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,378 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 301). 
41 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(b), 80 Fed. Reg. 64,378, 64,380 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
42 Id. 
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intentionally chosen not to denominate those relationships as marriages,” (2) recognizing these 
relationships might upset the expectations of couples who entered into them to reap greater 
federal benefits (under Social Security, for example) than they would if they were “married,” and 
(3) “no provision of the Code indicates that Congress intended to recognize as marriages civil 
unions, registered domestic partnerships, or similar relationships.”43 
IV.  REACTION TO THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
The IRS received only a handful of responses to the proposed regulations—a total of a 
dozen individuals and organizations submitted comments. One of those comments consisted of a 
single sentence of religious protest: “Marriage is between one man and one woman ordained by 
God not the government.”44 Another likewise went beyond the scope of the regulations by urging 
the IRS to take a position regarding the application of Obergefell’s constitutional analysis to the 
laws of states that recognize common-law marriage.45 Of the comments that addressed matters 
within the IRS’s purview, the discussion below focuses on those regarding the proposed rules 
relating to marriage alternatives. 
                                                 
43 Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status, supra note 40, at 64,379. 
44 Donald Smith Jr., Comment on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms Relating 
to Marital Status (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-
0013. 
45 John J. Masselli, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms 
Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-
0032-0005. 
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A. Comments of General Support
Some comments voiced general support for the proposed regulations. A trio of labor 
organizations applauded the IRS for issuing guidance in the form of regulations rather than 
relying on the more informal (and less visible) types of guidance that it historically used to 
address tax issues relevant to the LGBTQ+ community.46 The Family Equality Council similarly 
applauded the IRS, but suggested that the IRS should amend its forms to use the gender-neutral 
term spouse rather than the terms husband and wife.47 
B. Neutral and Supportive Comments
Several commenters directly addressed the IRS’s decision not to recognize marriage 
alternatives. One commenter voiced neither support nor opposition to the IRS’s decision.48 
Instead, he merely suggested that the IRS add a section to the proposed regulations addressing 
questions faced by registered domestic partners in community property states that stem from the 
tension between (1) the IRS’s preexisting position recognizing the application of state property 
law to domestic partners and (2) the intersection of the proposed regulations with Code 
provisions that speak to the treatment of married couples under community property regimes.49 
Two commenters wrote in support of the IRS’s decision not to recognize marriage 
alternatives. Mark Wojcik, a professor at John Marshall Law School, framed his support as 
46 AFL-CIO, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms Relating 
to Marital Status (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-
0015; AFSCME, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms 
Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-
0032-0010; Am. Fed’n of Tchrs, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing 
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respecting the choice made by couples to remain in a civil union or domestic partnership even 
after the advent of same-sex marriage.50 Wojcik’s comments made no mention, however, of the 
plight of couples who cannot convert their civil union or domestic partnership into a marriage 
(e.g., due to the death or incapacity of one of the partners or breakdown of the relationship) or of 
intact couples whose choice of relationship status is circumscribed by continuing fears of 
discrimination—subjects that were directly addressed by some of those who wrote in opposition 
to the proposed regulations’ treatment of marriage alternatives, as discussed below.51  
Stephanie Hunter McMahon, a professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, 
opened her supportive comments with a focus on Code § 6013(a), which authorizes joint filing of 
Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0017. 
47 Family Equality Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of 
Terms Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-
2015-0032-0004. 
48 Robert Denham, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms 
Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-
0032-0016. 
49 Id. 
50 Mark E. Wojcik, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of Terms 
Relating to Marital Status (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-
0032-0014. 
51 See infra Part IV.C. 
16 
income tax returns.52 McMahon observed that this provision only permits “[a] husband and wife” 
to file a joint return.53 Based on the text of § 6013, McMahon argued that the IRS has no 
authority to “overwrite the statute” and extend legal recognition to marriage alternatives because 
marriage alternatives are not specifically mentioned in the statute.54 However, taken to its logical 
conclusion, that argument would also seem to preclude the IRS from recognizing same-sex 
marriages through the proposed regulations—after all, permitting married same-sex couples to 
file jointly would just as clearly overwrite the statute by undoing § 6013(a)’s explicit limitation 
of joint filing not just to married couples but specifically to different-sex married couples (i.e., “a 
husband and wife”).55 Under McMahon’s argument, it would seem that Congress alone has the 
power to amend the law to comply with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s marriage equality 
decisions—as she says, “Extension of joint filing beyond the statute is a decision for Congress 
and not the Treasury Department.”56 Compounding the logical problems with her argument, 
McMahon paradoxically suggested that, before Obergefell, the IRS would have been justified in 
52 Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition 
of Terms Relating to Marital Status (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0008. 
53 Id. at 1; I.R.C. § 6013(a). 
54 McMahon, supra note 52, at 1. 
55 I.R.C. § 6013(a). 
56 McMahon, supra note 52, at 1. 
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recognizing marriage alternatives to afford equitable treatment to same-sex couples, even 
though, according to her reading of the statute, this action would be ultra vires and invalid.57  
McMahon further justified her support for the proposed regulations on policy grounds. 
She asserted that recognizing marriage alternatives would cause a drain on government resources 
because the IRS would need to evaluate the rights and obligations of each marriage alternative to 
determine whether it is sufficiently equivalent to marriage.58 Undercutting her own point, 
however, McMahon made a passing reference to how the IRS had previously dealt with and 
resolved similar issues created by the proliferation of different forms of business entities.59 
McMahon also pointed to the potential for abuse by states colluding with their citizens to create 
marriage alternatives to achieve tax advantages.60 But in making this argument, McMahon 
ignored both that marriage itself has given rise to the pervasive need to police taxpayer abuse and 
that refusing recognition to marriage alternatives only creates new and further possibilities for 
abuse. 
C. Comments in Opposition 
Three commenters strongly opposed the IRS’s decision to refuse recognition to marriage 
alternatives. The Human Rights Campaign urged the IRS to recognize civil unions and domestic 
partnerships both because other agencies (e.g., the Social Security Administration) already 
recognize these relationships and because “marriage remains out of reach for many same-sex 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2. 
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couples due to fear of discrimination.”61 Donald Read, a long-time tax practitioner and then-
member of the IRS Advisory Council, also urged the IRS to recognize marriage alternatives.62 
Read rejected the IRS’s rationales for refusing such recognition as “contrived and 
unpersuasive.”63 The ABA Section of Taxation (Tax Section) similarly described the IRS’s 
decision to deny legal recognition to marriage alternatives as “seriously flawed.”64 
With respect to the first justification proffered by the IRS (i.e., deference to state law), 
Read argued that “[t]he proposed regulations do not show the deference to state domestic 
61 Hum. Rts. Campaign, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing Definition of 
Terms Relating to Marital Status 2 (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0009. 
62 Donald H. Read, Supplemental Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing 
Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0020. 
63 Donald H. Read, Supplemental Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing 
Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status 2 (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0012. 
64 Section of Tax’n, Am. Bar Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Containing 
Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status 6 (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2015-0032-0007. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I served as the principal author of these comments on behalf of the Tax Section, 
working together with members of the Section’s Teaching Taxation Committee and a 
practitioner from its Estate & Gift Tax Committee. 
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relations law that the [IRS] asserts. The proposed regulations do violence to the principles of 
Windsor and Obergefell. And they violate longstanding ‘cornerstone’ tax principle that substance 
should prevail over form.”65 Like Read, the Tax Section observed that the IRS was not actually 
deferring to the states as it purported to be doing: 
The state legislatures were in most cases limited in their ability to recognize 
same-sex relationships either as a political matter or by a state constitutional 
provision that banned them from enacting legislation extending “marriage” to 
same-sex couples. It is also important to bear in mind that when they first 
appeared on the scene, civil unions and domestic partnerships were heralded as 
granting full equality to same-sex couples, but within a short time came to be seen 
as doing nothing more than relegating same-sex couples to a second-class, 
separate-but-equal status. With this history in mind, it becomes clear that to deny 
legal recognition to these relationships based on the label applied to them—
especially, but not exclusively, in open years when these relationships were the 
only legal status available to same-sex couples—would make the [IRS] a party to 
the very sort of discrimination that the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional in Obergefell and Windsor and that the [IRS] is attempting to 
remedy through the Proposed Regulations.66 
                                                 
65 Read, supra note 62, at 1–2. 
66 Section of Tax’n, supra note 64, at 6–7. 
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The Tax Section argued that, “[t]o truly defer to the states, the [IRS] should ignore the labels 
applied to these alternative relationships and be guided instead by their legal equivalence to 
marriage under state law in determining their federal tax treatment.”67 
With respect to the second justification proffered by the IRS (i.e., frustrated expectations 
of couples in marriage alternatives), Read explained that this justification was nothing more than 
a red herring. Before the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decisions, the only couples who 
ostensibly had a choice between marriage and a civil union or domestic partnership were 
different-sex couples—the same-sex couples for whom these alternatives were originally 
designed had little or no choice among relationship statuses.68 The Tax Section further noted 
that, even after the Supreme Court decisions, some same-sex couples remained trapped in 
alternative relationships and unable to marry because of the death or incapacity of one of the 
partners—and the same is, of course, true for those whose relationships broke down before 
marriage became available but who did not split until afterward.69 These couples never had a real 
“choice” among relationship statuses that the IRS would be honoring—their only choice was 
between a marriage alternative or no legal recognition at all. Compounding the IRS’s disregard 
for couples still suffering the legacy of unconstitutional discrimination, the Tax Section pointed 
out that the actual expectation of all couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships prior to 
2013 was—based on the IRS’s own informal guidance—that these relationships would be 
                                                 
67 Id. at 7. 
68 Read, supra note 62, at 2–3. 
69 Section of Tax’n, supra note 64, at 9. 
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recognized for federal tax purposes.70 If anything, it was the IRS’s post-Windsor change in 
position that frustrated taxpayer expectations.71 
Furthermore, both Read and the Tax Section opposed the idea that interpretation of the 
tax laws should be dictated by couples’ expectations regarding the tax and nontax benefits that 
they might achieve through abusive behavior that takes advantage of gaps in the law. The Tax 
Section noted that the tax law doctrine of substance over form was designed precisely to combat 
such behavior and also noted that setting tax policy in order to influence Social Security (or other 
federal) benefits is outside the IRS’s purview.72 And, as Read remarked, “it is not clear that their 
device works—Social Security bases spousal status for benefits on whether one person would 
take from the other under intestacy laws, which, in California, registered domestic partners 
clearly do.”73 
With respect to the final justification proffered by the IRS (i.e., that Congress had not 
enacted a provision recognizing marriage alternatives), both Read and the Tax Section 
underscored how untenable this argument is, with the Tax Section explaining: 
[U]ntil the Windsor decision, Congress refused to treat even married same-sex 
couples as spouses for federal tax purposes. It is implausible to expect that 
Congress would have enacted a provision indicating that if the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act were ever struck down, only married spouses and not registered 
                                                 
70 Id. at 8–9. 
71 Id. at 9. 
72 Id. at 10. 
73 Read, supra note 62, at 3. 
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domestic partners or parties to a civil union could be treated as married. 
Moreover, the lack of a specific provision in the Code addressing the exact 
situation faced by a taxpayer has never been a barrier to the application of the 
principle of substance over form; indeed, the inability of Congress to timely 
address every situation faced by taxpayers is the raison d’être of that principle.74 
The Tax Section concluded its comments by noting that the IRS’s proposed rule 
regarding the recognition of marriage was inconsistent with its position regarding marriage 
alternatives. The proposed regulations would recognize a marriage so long as any state, 
possession, or territory would recognize the relationship as a marriage.75 As the Tax Section 
observed, some states already recognized as a marriage not only civil unions and domestic 
partnerships but any relationship that has “substantially” the same rights and obligations as a 
marriage.76 Thus, despite purporting to deny recognition to marriage alternatives, the proposed 
rule for determining marital status actually would require the IRS to recognize marriage 
alternatives because at least one state already classified them as marriages under its laws. 
V. THE FINAL REGULATIONS
In its discussion of the comments regarding the IRS’s treatment of marriage alternatives,
the preamble to the final regulations first summarized the IRS’s position and then stated: 
“Several commenters submitted comments addressing this section of the proposed regulations. 
74 Section of Tax’n, supra note 64, at 11. 
75 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(b), 80 Fed. Reg. 64,378, 64,380 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
76 Section of Tax’n, supra note 64, at 11–12. 
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Many agreed with [refusing recognition to marriage alternatives], but three did not.”77 This 
description of the support for the IRS’s position is misleading. With only a dozen commenters in 
total on a regulation project that touches millions of lives, it stretches credulity to use the word 
many to characterize the number who expressed agreement with the IRS. Moreover, of the dozen 
comments received, only half addressed marriage alternatives—these are the “several 
commenters” inexactly referenced by the IRS. Of that group, half were either neutral or 
supportive and half strongly opposed the rule; yet, the IRS’s ambiguous phrasing makes it seem 
as if opponents were a tiny minority of those who addressed the refusal to recognize marriage 
alternatives. It only becomes apparent in the ensuing discussion of specific comments that the 
IRS included among the “many” who supported its position not only those who simply expressed 
general support for the proposed regulations but also those who made comments outside of the 
scope of the regulations altogether.78 By exaggerating support for its decision to deny recognition 
to marriage alternatives, the IRS made clear from the start how little interest it had in hearing 
criticism of its position or in altering the rule in the proposed regulations. 
When addressing the specific comments on its position regarding marriage alternatives, 
the IRS did not identify or explain any of the flaws or logical inconsistencies in the arguments 
made by those supporting its position; it embraced those arguments unquestioningly.79 In 
contrast, the critiques leveled at the IRS’s position regarding marriage alternatives received a 
                                                 
77 T.D. 9785, 2016-38 I.R.B. 361, 365. 
78 Id. at 368. 
79 Id. at 365. See supra Part IV.B for discussion of some of the flaws in the supportive 
comments. 
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skeptical reception. The IRS alternatively minimized, disregarded, or turned these critiques on 
their head, standing steadfast with its original position that maintained the illusion of deference 
to the states and the existence of “choice” among relationship statuses.80 The IRS’s attitude 
toward these critiques is summed up in a single sentence from the preamble to the final 
regulations: “Treasury and the IRS disagree with the commenters and continue to believe that the 
regulation should not treat registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, and other similar 
relationships— entered into in states that continue to distinguish these relationships from 
marriages—as marriage for federal tax purposes.”81 The IRS had quite obviously decided on its 
position and was not going to be persuaded by arguments to the contrary. 
The only critique of its position that the IRS did accept was the one pointing out a 
conflict in the proposed regulations. The IRS acknowledged that its rule affording recognition to 
a relationship that any state, possession, or territory would recognize as a marriage would 
undermine its position regarding marriage alternatives because several states already treated 
marriage alternatives as marriages under their own laws.82 Yet, despite professing its deference 
to the judgment of the states, the IRS stubbornly refused to respect the judgment of those 
states—a group including both states that had created marriage alternatives (i.e., Connecticut and 
New Hampshire) and those that had not (i.e., Massachusetts)—that relationships that entail 
similar rights and obligations should be treated similarly under the law.83 Turning its back on 
                                                 
80 T.D. 9785, 2016-38 I.R.B. at 365–68. 
81 Id. at 367. 
82 Id. at 363. 
83 Section of Tax’n, supra note 64, at 11. 
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core tax policy principles and forfeiting its usual role of combating abuse, the IRS revised the 
final regulations to tighten its privileging of marriage by specifying that the determination of 
whether a relationship is a marriage or a marriage alternative would be made under the law of the 
state where the relationship was celebrated.84 
VI. GRAMSCIAN HEGEMONY 
Critical legal scholars have recognized that Antonio Gramsci’s “work on hegemony 
provides a useful starting point for [those] who understand that domination is often subtle, 
invisible, and consensual.”85 This work on hegemony serves as a powerful lens for examining the 
IRS’s implementation of the Windsor and Obergefell decisions, illustrating the complex 
relationship between legal and social change and how the dominant group in society protects and 
preserves its privilege in response to demands for change from subordinated groups. In this Part, 
a brief description of the Gramscian notion of hegemony is provided in order to lay the 
groundwork for that examination in the next Part of this essay.86 
                                                 
84 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(c) (2016). 
85 Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 519; e.g., 
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 12 GERMAN L.J. 247 (2011); Aníbal Rosario-Lebrón, 
For Better and for Better: The Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 189 
(2013). 
86 This description is adapted from Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 
1243–49 (2008) [hereinafter Infanti, Tax Equity], which applies the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony more broadly in a tax context than just the particular manifestation described here. 
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In his influential Prison Notebooks, Gramsci posited that a social group maintains its 
supremacy through a combination of force and consent.87 As he put it: 
[T]he supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” 
and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group dominates antagonistic 
groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed 
force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, 
already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power (this indeed is 
one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently 
becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its 
grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well.88 
“Domination” is associated with “[t]he apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ 
enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively.”89 This 
force may be applied by the military or by the courts, and the threat of future force hangs over 
those who currently consent to their own subordination but who later change their minds.90 Yet, 
                                                 
For another example of a broader application of Gramscian hegemony, see ANTHONY C. 
INFANTI, OUR SELFISH TAX LAWS: TOWARD TAX REFORM THAT MIRRORS OUR BETTER SELVES 
137–59 (2018) [hereinafter INFANTI, SELFISH TAX LAWS]. 
87 SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 12 (Quintin Hoare & 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971) [hereinafter PRISON NOTEBOOKS]. 
88 Id. at 57–58. 
89 Id. at 12. 
90 Id. at 12; see Litowitz, supra note 85, at 519. 
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domination alone is insufficient to maintain lasting control over subordinated groups. The 
dominant group must also exercise “leadership,” which Gramsci often labeled hegemony.91 The 
“leadership” (or “hegemony”) that Gramsci speaks of is a leadership of ideas. Gramsci observed 
that, through a dominant group’s exercise of ideological leadership, it could actually secure the 
consent of other groups to their own subordination. Despite feeling uncoerced, this consent is 
shaped and influenced by past history, including past exercises of “leadership,” which 
subordinated groups have internalized to the point where it has simply come to feel normal and 
natural.92 To secure subordinated groups’ consent, the dominant group offers a conception of life 
or worldview that serves its own interests, but that, at the same time, taps into this internalized 
past history in a way that makes that worldview appealing to both intellectuals and the masses.93 
Of course, the dominant group must make some sacrifices to subordinated groups in 
fashioning this worldview in order to align their interests and make the subordinated groups’ 
consent feasible; however, those sacrifices occur only at the margins and never jeopardize the 
dominant group’s control.94 With some effort, the dominant group’s worldview (as tempered to 
appeal to subordinated groups) can eventually transform the “popular ‘mentality”’ and come to 
be “concretely—i.e. historically and socially—universal.”95 Once a worldview achieves such 
91 Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Preface to PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 87, at ix, 
xiii–xiv. 
92 PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 87, at 196–200. 
93 Id. at 328–29, 341, 421–22. 
94 Id. at 161. 
95 Id. at 348. 
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mass acceptance, it comes to seem natural or normal, and it becomes “implicitly manifest in art, 
in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life.”96 
[This] type of control … is more insidious and complicated to achieve. It involves 
subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through subtle dissemination of the 
dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the point where the 
dominant beliefs and practices become an intractable component of common 
sense. In a hegemonic regime, an unjust social arrangement is internalized and 
endlessly reinforced in schools, churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges, 
museums, and popular culture.97 
Gramsci envisioned law as playing a dual role that corresponds to the notions 
of “domination” and “hegemony.”98 Obviously, the law furthers “domination” through its 
repressive function of punishing those who fail to conform to the norms promulgated by the 
dominant group.99  At the same time, however, the law furthers ideological hegemony by serving 
an assimilationist/educational function: 
This problem contains in a nutshell the entire “juridical problem”, i.e. the problem 
of assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced fraction; it is a problem of 
education of the masses, of their “adaptation” in accordance with the requirements 
of the goal to be achieved. This is precisely the function of law in the State and in 
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society; through “law” the State renders the ruling group “homogeneous”, and 
tends to create a social conformism which is useful to the ruling group’s line of 
development.100 
In this regard, Gramsci saw law’s influence as extending beyond the area of positive law and into 
general notions of morality and customs, allowing the “leadership” of the dominant group to be 
brought to bear even in areas where people feel that their actions are spontaneous and free.101 
A. Channeling Privilege 
In the United States, marriage and the “traditional” family are core components of the 
worldview offered by the dominant group—its articulation of the “normal” and “natural” that has 
come to be manifested in all aspects of American life. As Marjorie Kornhauser has observed, 
“the one-breadwinner, married-couple family holds special political and historical meaning in the 
United States.”102 Naturally, this worldview surfaces in federal tax laws that are riddled with 
considerations of marital and familial status,103 going so far as to reward so-called traditional 
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families with marriage “bonuses” that allow breadwinning husbands to pay less tax than they 
would have, had they not married their stay-at-home spouses104: 
[T]he tax laws endorse a specific family type as the ideal against which all others
should be measured and to which all should aspire, and they exert a powerful 
influence to close the door on alternative relationship statuses that might provide 
couples with a choice among different levels of legal recognition. The taxable unit 
is—and especially during the battles over same-sex marriage, was—a highly 
visible embodiment of “an ‘ideology of marriage and family’ that exalts marriage 
and nuclear family above all other personal relationships, and that is so deeply 
ingrained in [American] society that it goes unrecognized and unchallenged.”105 
The IRS’s implementation of Windsor and Obergefell reflects and reifies this privileging 
of the “traditional” family. Notably, the IRS did not implement Windsor and Obergefell under a 
conservative administration otherwise hostile to LGBTQ+ rights. Yet, even under the Obama 
administration, which eventually came around to full-throated public support of same-sex 
104 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS ¶ 
111.5.5 Westlaw (database updated 2020). 
105 INFANTI, SELFISH TAX LAWS, supra note 86, at 88 (quoting Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest 
Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 672 (2010)). 
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marriage and LGBTQ+ rights,106 the IRS’s implementation of the Windsor and Obergefell 
decisions was tinged with the reactionary hues of coercive homonormativity.  
The application of the Supreme Court’s marriage equality decisions to the federal tax 
laws demonstrates how the dominant group in society contends with agitation for social change 
from subordinated groups and how an accepted heteronormative “worldview” can influence the 
interpretation and application of law. While the dominant group may make sacrifices to quiet 
subordinated groups and bring them into the fold, those sacrifices will be limited in nature—or, 
as Gramsci has put it, “such sacrifices … cannot touch the essential.”107 Thus, in Revenue Ruling 
2013-17, the IRS chose (1) to adopt a generous place-of-celebration rule for recognizing same-
sex marriages that treated same-sex couples as married for federal tax purposes even if they lived 
in one of the many states that refused to recognize their marriages; and (2) to embrace a broad, 
gender-neutral reading of the terms husband and wife that includes both different-sex and same-
sex couples. Juxtaposed against these strongly homonormative positions, the IRS took what, in 
retrospect, appear to be clear and consistent steps to cabin the LGBTQ+ movement’s legal 
victories in ways that both perpetuate past harms caused by tax discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and stymie progress toward a society that eliminates the privileges historically 
accorded to heterosexuality and marriage. 
106 See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011); U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, 
“Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students” (2016). 
107 PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 87, at 161. 
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B. Heterosexual Privilege 
When deciding to deny legal recognition to marriage alternatives, the IRS turned a blind 
eye to the history of legal discrimination against same-sex couples. Ignorance of how its position 
reverberated against this historical background might have been a plausible excuse for the IRS’s 
initial guidance denying recognition to marriage alternatives; however, the plausibility of that 
excuse evaporated once comments on the proposed regulations directly addressed their impact on 
LGBTQ+ taxpayers and placed the regulations in the context of long-standing discrimination 
against same-sex couples. But faced with these comments, the IRS exhibited an unwavering 
adherence to its initial position through its unquestioning acceptance of the comments submitted 
by those who favored its perspective and its exaggeration of the level of support among 
commenters for denying legal recognition to marriage alternatives. 
While essentially ignoring the discrimination experienced by same-sex couples, the IRS 
chose to privilege and showcase the experience of different-sex couples and to embrace a 
strongly heteronormative view of the social context when explaining its decision to deny legal 
recognition to marriage alternatives. Before Windsor, some different-sex couples took advantage 
of marriage alternatives—which had primarily been created to keep same-sex couples in second-
class, “separate-but-equal” relationships—to arbitrage and benefit from the perceived legal gaps 
between marriage, on the one hand, and civil unions and domestic partnerships, on the other. 
When federal legal recognition was extended to married same-sex couples in Windsor, the IRS 
suddenly became preoccupied with different-sex couples’ ability to reap the real or imagined 
benefits of being in a relationship that was not denominated marriage. The IRS ignored its own 
earlier guidance on the treatment of marriage alternatives—which had been disseminated among 
the tax bar and echoed by the Illinois Department of Revenue—so that it could fashion a claim of 
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frustrated expectations out of whole cloth in order to ensure that the benefits that different-sex 
couples hoped to reap when they entered into marriage alternatives would remain undisturbed. 
Further entrenching heterosexual privilege, the IRS cast aside as irrelevant: (1) the fact that 
same-sex couples did not have the same ability to choose among legally recognized relationships 
as different-sex couples did prior to Windsor (and because of the continued legality of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in many states, still do not); (2) the fact that some 
same-sex couples who entered into civil unions and domestic partnerships could not marry even 
after Windsor and Obergefell (e.g., due to incapacity, death, or breakdown of the relationship); 
and (3) the idea that the IRS should adhere to its historic role of protecting against taxpayer 
abuse of the law.  
The IRS has underscored its privileging of the needs of different-sex couples over those 
of same-sex couples through its general failure to provide guidance to same-sex couples 
regarding the application of Windsor and Obergefell to years before those decisions were 
issued.108 For example, rather than shatter the illusion of taxpayer “choice” among legal 
relationships, the IRS has provided no transitional relief to same-sex couples who found 
themselves trapped in marriage alternatives when the Supreme Court decided Windsor and 
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Obergefell and have never enjoyed a “choice” among relationship statuses. The IRS has likewise 
failed to address a problem quickly identified following Windsor concerning the tax expectations 
of married same-sex couples whose divorces and alimony arrangements predate (and, 
importantly, could not and did not contemplate or anticipate) that decision.109 The IRS has 
neither provided guidance nor transitional relief to same-sex couples in these situations, despite 
their legitimate claims of frustrated expectations.  
Windsor and Obergefell have thus brought recognition to a slice of same-sex 
relationships for federal tax purposes, but without any acknowledgment of, let alone any serious 
attempt to redress, the effects of discrimination suffered by the LGBTQ+ community. Indeed, 
while ostensibly implementing judicial decisions extending legal recognition to same-sex 
relationships, the IRS has placed front and center the needs and perspective of a segment of 
different-sex couples—couples who suffered no discrimination but who attempted to engage in 
abusive behavior by leveraging their heterosexual privilege to arbitrage legal gaps between 
marriage and its alternatives. It is little wonder, then, that the IRS’s efforts to recognize same-sex 
relationships have had the effect of preserving and protecting heterosexual privilege. The IRS’s 
actions bring to mind Gramsci’s observation that “[s]ubaltern groups are always subject to the 
activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up … . In reality, even when they appear 
triumphant, the subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves … .”110 
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C. Marital Privilege 
Following the Obergefell decision, Melissa Murray expressed concern that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had only further entrenched the importance of marriage with that decision, at the 
cost of “render[ing] nonmarital families less valuable and less worthy.”111 Murray’s concerns 
have clearly been borne out in the IRS’s implementation of the Windsor and Obergefell 
decisions. The IRS has dashed any hope that the Court’s same-sex marriage decisions might 
open the door to recognizing a broader array of conjugal and nonconjugal relationships for 
federal tax purposes.  
In reality, the IRS’s decision goes a step further by punishing many couples who enter 
into marriage alternatives. In states that recognize marriage alternatives and that have an income 
tax that piggybacks on the federal income tax (e.g., California and Hawaii), couples in civil 
unions and domestic partnerships find that the IRS has multiplied their tax return filing 
obligations. Couples in these states need to fill out extra forms just to convert their separate 
federal returns into joint state returns.112 These couples also find themselves at greater risk for 
being audited by state tax authorities because the information reported to the federal and state 
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governments differs due to the mismatch between their state and federal filing statuses.113 In 
other states (e.g., Colorado and Illinois), couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships have 
lost the benefit of joint filing because the state compels them to file separate returns using their 
federal filing status.114 
Even among those who do marry, the IRS has privileged a certain type of marriage: 
“traditional” marriage. Comments on the proposed regulations suggested that the IRS should 
“specifically reference ‘same-sex marriage’ so that the definitions apply regardless of gender and 
to avoid any potential issues of interpretation.”115 The IRS rejected this suggestion and instead 
embraced the gendered/heterosexual terms husband and wife. The final regulations provide that, 
“[f]or federal tax purposes, the terms spouse, husband, and wife mean an individual lawfully 
married to another individual. The term husband and wife means two individuals lawfully 
married to each other.”116 Incomprehensibly, the IRS justified its rejection of the commenter’s 
suggestion on the ground that “[a]mending the regulations to specifically address a marriage of 
two individuals of the same sex would undermine the goal of these regulations to eliminate 
113 See Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition 
Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29 
(2012). 
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-15-117 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); 35 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/502(c) (Westlaw through P.A. 101-651); Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 2019 Form IL-1040 
Instructions, at 5–6 (2019). 
115 T.D. 9785, 2016-38 I.R.B. 361, 362; see Wojcik, supra note 50. 
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distinctions in federal tax law based on gender.”117 In effect, the IRS created definitions of 
marriage, husband, and wife that, rather than recognizing LGBTQ+ taxpayers and their 
relationships as required by Windsor and Obergefell, subsumed the homosexual into the 
heterosexual.  
This legal erasure of homosexuality dovetails with the privileging of heterosexuality 
discussed earlier and sends the message that taxpayers remain presumptively heterosexual even 
after Windsor. After all, the statutory and regulations sections that contain the gendered terms 
husband and wife outnumber the regulation defining these terms by more than 270 to 1.118 
Moreover, this erasure reinforces the demand that members of the LGBTQ+ community conform 
their behavior to heterosexual norms in order for their relationships to be recognized—a demand 
that inheres in the refusal to recognize marriage alternatives. 
Though this privileging of marriage and heterosexuality is quite purposeful and coercive, 
there is no indication or evidence that either the IRS under the Obama administration or those 
who submitted comments in agreement with its position were animated by malice toward the 
LGBTQ+ community. After all, domination and subordination are complex and insidious forces, 
and they often operate in ways that are “subtle, invisible, and consensual.”119 The privileging of 
marriage and heterosexuality has surrounded all of us for so long that, in many ways, it just 
117 T.D. 9785, 2016-38 I.R.B. at 362. 
118 Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax 
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1210–12 (2014) (searches updated 
September 2019). 
119 Litowitz, supra note 85, at 519. 
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seems normal and natural—an unarticulated part of the way in which we see the world. The IRS 
formulated its post-Windsor positions (and commenters agreed with those positions) influenced 
by this worldview and, even more importantly, against the background of an Internal Revenue 
Code that contains a taxable unit structured on and around marriage and that rewards with 
marriage “bonuses” those who conform to a 1950s, The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet vision 
of the American family. Our tax laws remain tightly moored to an idealized past and, having 
endorsed a specific family type as the ideal, the extant structure of the tax system could only 
have exerted a powerful influence on the IRS and others intimately connected with the tax 
system to deny recognition to alternative relationship statuses in a coercive move to reaffirm the 
importance and privilege of heterosexual marriage. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
Looking back at Stoddard’s and Ettelbrick’s exchange in the early years following the 
advent of marriage equality, it seems that Ettelbrick was both prescient and justifiably skeptical 
of the transformative potential of same-sex marriage—at least insofar as the federal tax domain 
is concerned. Far from witnessing the tumbling (or even slow crumbling) of hierarchies and the 
embrace of more expansive and inclusive approaches to legal recognition of the family in this 
area of the law, we have witnessed the quiet workings of domination/subordination through the 
reinforcement of hierarchies and reification of privilege, forcible legal assimilation/erasure, and 
new steps toward exclusion of the traditionally subordinated. It may simply be that Stoddard and 
others expected too much work to be done by marriage equality alone and that Ettelbrick was 
more realistic about the limited work that marriage equality could and would do for the 
LGBTQ+ movement.  
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This case study has demonstrated the power of entrenched societal institutions such as 
marriage to stymie or cabin efforts to effect social change through legal change, especially where 
those efforts threaten established and entrenched privilege. If the goals of the early LGBTQ+ 
movement to affirm difference and validate choice among family structures are to be achieved, it 
will not be through the simple embrace of “traditional” marriage but through the continued hard 
work of chipping away at its hegemony and by offering a more inclusive and appealing view of 
how our society might approach difference at the individual and family levels.120 This work 
should include, among other things, advocacy not only from tax academics but also from the 
practicing tax bar and the public for: 
 LGBTQ+ interest groups and activists to pay attention to the impact of the tax 
system on the LGBTQ+ community. Though not as “exciting” as some other 
areas of the law, tax law has a wider, more sustained, and more direct impact on 
members of the LGBTQ+ community than most (if not all) other areas of law.121 
 Resistance to coerced tax homonormativity through a move to an individual tax 
filing regime, which could open the way to accommodating a variety of conjugal 
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and nonconjugal relationships for tax purposes and produce a tax system that 
better reflects the diversity of family relationships in American society.122 
 Ferreting out and elimination of the vestiges of heteronormativity that mark our
tax system.123
 Taking active steps to redress the decades of discrimination perpetrated against
the LGBTQ+ community through our tax system;124 for example, by (1) affording
transitional relief to those unable or unwilling to marry in order to mitigate the
effects of past tax discrimination and (2) waiving the statute of limitations on
refunds for claims arising out of the retroactive application of the Windsor and
Obergefell cases to the federal tax laws.125
122 See Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax 
Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605. 
123 See, e.g., Infanti, supra note 118. 
124 Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous 
Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407 (2008). 
125 See PRIDE Act of 2019, H.R. 3299, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
